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Is Milosevic getting a fair 
trial at The Hague?
by Sir Ivan Lawrence QC
The author   who has recently been engaged for six months as leading 
defence counsel in another war crimes trial at the Hague   thinks that 
despite serious procedural flaws the Tribunal is likely to produce as fair 
a trial as anywhere in the world if only because the judges will want to 
be seen to be being fair with the eyes of the world upon them.
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic is nowhere near completion, but already it seems that he has been tried by world opinion and die media and found 
guilty on all charges. So is he getting a fair trial before this
o J o o o
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
at The Hague?
To most people, a trial is fair if it convicts the guilty and 
acquits the innocent. To the lawyer, concerned with 
process, a trial is fair if it conforms with such 
internationally accepted rules, laid down by statute or 
convention, as the presumption of innocence, the right for 
the accused to be present at his trial, to defend himself or 
be represented by a qualified lawyer, to have specific 
allegations presented clearly and simply, to have all the 
evidence against him disclosed with time to prepare his 
defence, to be tried with as little delay as possible before a 
properly constituted court and to have a right of appeal if 
he should be convicted.
Milosevic is not, of course, being tried either by world 
opinion or a jury, but by three judges trained and 
experienced in these rules and to exclude from their 
minds media opinion and tittle-tattle. They will 
concentrate their minds not on his irrelevant video display 
and four hour tirade about the legitimacy and results of the 
NATO bombing and the right of Serbs to go to war with 
their enemies, but on the precise accusations against 
Milosevic that he committed genocide, war crimes or 
crimes of inhumanity against innocent civilians. As to his 
refusal to recognise the authority of the Tribunal, that may 
be somewhat compromised by the fact that he committed 
himself to co-operating with the Tribunal, set up by the 
United Nations Security Council, when he signed the 
Dayton Accords which ended the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.
Nevertheless, Milosevic is by no means alone in having 
serious doubts about the Hague Tribunal. Some doubt its 
political desirability. Others doubt its legitimacy. Some,
who do not doubt either, have qualms about the definition 
of criminal culpability, which the Tribunal is developing 
and about the legal processes it is laying down for the 
achievement of justice.
THE POLITICS OF THE TRIBUNAL
Not every Government is happy about giving this 
institution the power to indict and try heads of state of any 
nation at war for the most serious of crimes for where 
might such power not lead? Might President Clinton beO I O
indicted for the killings that resulted from his order too
bomb Somalia? Tony Blair for supporting Clinton in the 
Nato bombing of Belgrade without the authority of the 
United Nations? Might President Putin of Russia beo
indicted for the killings in Chechnya? Margaret Thatcher 
for ordering the sinking of the Belgrano in the Falklands 
War? Could it even be that ministers of countries who 
negotiated with Milosevic whilst the Balkan killings were in 
progress and who might be taken to have known what he 
was alleged to have done, be indicted on the grounds that, 
by dealing with him and thereby signalling encouragement, 
they made themselves a party to his wrongdoing?
Is there not a real danger, as Milosevic alleges, that the
o ' o '
Tribunal will be used as a political tool of states in conflict 
with each other rather than as a purely legal entity for 
achieving universally agreed justice? Would it not, in any 
event, be far better for sovereign states to try their own 
alleged war crimes perpetrators?
Indeed is not Milosevic justifiably arguing that those 
who brought him before the Tribunal are inconsistent and 
hypocritical; for if it was considered to be so vital to have 
United Nations authority before the bombing started in 
the Gulf War why was its authority deliberately not sought 
before the bombing of Belgrade? And, he seems to be 
arguing, if the major powers did not feel that they could 
rely on the authority of the UN before killing innocent 
civilians in his country's capital city, why should he be
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expected to subject himself to that same authority to be 
tried for killing civilians in Yugoslavia?
Such arguments may be of little practical assistance to 
Milosevic now, since the Tribunal has been set up and 
working these past nine years and he has been brought 
before it with hardly any Governmental disapproval 
worldwide. But questions about the fairness of the process 
may be another matter.
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TRIBUNAL
The creation of the Tribunal ought, ideally, to have been 
authorised by the full General Assembly of the UN; in fact 
its authority comes only from the seven countries 
represented in the Security Council. The explanation for 
this, it was said, was that the establishment of such a 
Tribunal to bring to justice those accused of war crimes in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was so urgent that there
o o
was not time to take the matter through the full 
procedures of the General Assembly. Others have said dial 
the truer reason for the short cut was that the major 
powers did not believe that they would carry the measure 
with the votes of enough countries however long the
o o
process lasted.
Some ask how the Tribunal can claim to be objective 
when the founding statute requires it to be an institution, 
which both prosecutes and judges in the same cause? 
Where is that apparent objectivity, others argue, when 
Article 1 of the same statute declares that 'The 
International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.' not, be it noted, those allegedly 
responsible for such violations. Does it not seem that there 
is here a presumption of guilt and the need to prove 
innocence?
It might be suggested that Milosevic can argue such 
fundamental matters before the Tribunal: but that would 
achieve little since the Tribunal has already considered 
such arguments in previous cases and, unsurprisingly, 
found against them   and their conclusion has been upheld 
by the Appellate Tribunal (made up of the same level of 
judges in the same building) against whom there can be no 
further appeal.
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The laws which the Tribunal has been enforcing since its 
inception in 1993 might surprise, if not alarm, the British 
common lawyer.
Of course in order to be guilty of crimes of genocide 
and against humanity like murder, torture and persecution, 
there must be guilty conduct by the accused coupled with 
a guilty intent to do that wrong. But what if there is no 
actual evidence, direct or indirect, mat an accused took 
part in the guilty conduct or had the necessary guilty 
intent?
Because of the Tribunal's doctrine of 'command 
responsibility' such lack of evidence is unlikely to spare 
him. Previous decisions of the Tribunal have established 
that if you are in a position of some authority, like a shift 
leader of a dozen guards, that may be enough for the 
Tribunal to infer that you knew what was going on even 
though there is no evidence that you actually did know:
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you may be found guilty if you did nothing to stop what 
there is no evidence you actually knew was happening. If 
you are party to a plan to lock up potential troublemakers 
in a camp and someone else commits murder or torture 
when you are not present and such activities were not in 
the original plan, you too will be guilty of that crime if you 
ought to have foreseen that others might torture oro o
murder. You would certainly be guilty if you failed to do 
what you could to find out what was happening. Even if 
you had no official authority to control the actions of your 
subordinates you would still be guilty if you did not stop 
them. And you would certainly be guilty if you knew what 
was going on and were sickened by it but you neither ran 
away nor did very much to help because you had every 
reason to believe you would be shot by your superiors for 
desertion or dereliction of duty. Before this Tribunal you 
can even be charged and convicted twice for the same
o
offence because your guilt may be considered to be 
cumulative.
Such decisions push the concept of individual 
responsibility for crimes to limits not previously 
encountered in the British courts.
THE PROCEDURE
The Tribunal's procedures will also raise many a British 
common-lawyer's eyebrows.
Whilst it is altogether reasonable to expect the Tribunal 
to address a novel situation, not specifically covered by the 
founding statute, by extending the law to make new rules, 
it is quite prepared to go further and over-ride the statute. 
If the statute provides for a situation which the Tribunal 
does not find acceptable, it has been known to argue that 
the statute is a treaty and therefore not set in stone and 
anyway, as it said in one case, there may have been a 
mistranslation, which no-one can have noticed hitherto, 
which warrants correction. In other words, the Tribunal is 
prepared to make up the law as it goes along   which 
hardly accords with normal common-law criminal law 
experience where it is a fundamental rule of justice that 
you should be able to know in advance exactly what the 
laws and procedures are.
Because the Tribunal judges are themselves the judges of 
the facts   and they do not have to leave findings of fact to 
a jury - they allow 'hearsay' evidence, which the United 
Kingdom jurisdiction excludes in case it might prejudice a 
jurors opinion of the accused. So what someone is 
overheard to be saying about the accused can form part of 
the evidence against him before the Tribunal, even if he
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was not present to challenge the statement, and the 
Tribunal will decide what weight to give that evidence,o o '
which so far, is perhaps, so good. But the Tribunal has been 
prepared to accept, as sufficient evidence of identification 
of an accused, the evidence of someone who did not know 
and cannot himself identify the person he saw, but who 
overheard a conversation several weeks after the event 
between people who were neither describing the event nor 
were present at it nor have been called to give evidence: a 
kind of third hand 'hearsay' identification. In the absence 
of identification parades, dock identification of the 
accused, which has such obvious dangers that it is usually 
disallowed in British courts, is usually accepted evidence 
before the Tribunal.
At the end of the prosecution's case, if a submission of 
'no case to answer' is made by the defence, die test which 
the Tribunal applies is whether there is any evidence at all 
against the accused: that is not the stage of the trial to
o o
consider whether the evidence is of sufficient quality or 
credibility to sustain a case against the accused. Whilst that 
would be understandable where, as in the United 
Kingdom, a jury is the ultimate judge of the weight and 
quality of the evidence, it hardly makes sense where there 
is no jury and the Tribunal may have to wait several months 
and incur much expense and trauma to witnesses and the 
accused before returning the not guilty verdict they would 
otherwise have returned so much sooner. Since all 
reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favour of the 
Prosecution at this stage, the impression given is that the 
accused is expected to call evidence to prove his 
innocence.
Cross-examination, the common-lawyer's best 
instrument for exposing weakness in a witness's evidence, 
is restricted by this Tribunal. Counsel are expected to limit 
cross-examination to the subject-matter of the witnesses 
evidence in chief   although some lee-way is given   and 
attempts to shake the witness by inviting him to change his 
testimony are frowned upon as repetitious time-wasting. 
Points of law on admissibility are taken in the presence of 
the witness who is thereby given an opportunity to prepare 
himself to deal with the matter. Showing him a previouso 1
inconsistent statement may not embarrass the witness, 
although the inconsistency can be put to him without 
producing the statement   which may not have quite the 
same effect. Expert evidence given in another case 
previously before the Tribunal may be presented in 
transcript form, and cross-examination is therefore not 
available even if the evidence was not given in the presence 
of the current accused, the witness's credibility is in issue, 
and new evidence is available since the witness last gave 
evidence which might change the expert's conclusions: 
such evidence, the Tribunal has ruled, can be challenged by 
calling expert evidence for the defence. Once again theor o
unfortunate impression is given that the accused has to r o
prove his innocence. Furthermore, if the expert witness is 
called and one defendant is allowed to cross-examine him,
the Tribunal may order that no other co-defendant can 
cross-examine him.
Each prosecution witness may have a further statement 
taken from him by counsel calling him shortly before he 
gives evidence, which means that he is reminded of what 
he is expected to say on any issue. The justification for this 
is presumably that if the witness has made several 
statements over a number of years following a traumatic 
event, it will lessen the chance of him having to rely on a 
confused recollection. The trouble with this is that the 
similarity between this and coaching a witness appears to 
be dangerously close. The fact that this same facility is 
allowed to the defence does not really balance the matter 
up, because the prosecution goes first and has to produce 
sufficient evidence of guilt before the defence even has to 
answer.
There are other variations from common-law practise. 
Submissions of 'no case to answer', no matter the 
number of counts in the indictment, the volume of issues 
which may have arisen in a trial lasting several months or 
the complexities of the sometimes novel law, have to be 
made in writing on no more than 10 double-spaced A4 
sheets of paper or 3000 words, and may be 
supplemented by a speech lasting no more than 45 
minutes. The prosecution, as in other jurisdictions has 
the right to appeal against a sentence, which they 
consider to be too lenient, but at The Hague they also 
have the right of appeal against the Tribunal's decision to 
acquit. Even more surprisingly, the Appeal Chamber can 
find an appellant guilty of additional counts and can then 
proceed to add further sentences.
Perhaps the most alarming rule requires the defence to 
call evidence in mitigation of sentence during the trial and 
before the defendant has been convicted. If the 
prosecution challenges such evidence, it may go to weaken 
and taint the defence case. If, for example, evidence is 
called from a psychologist to show a degree of mental 
instability, it may go to show that the unlikely may very well 
have happened. The justification for such a rule   that it is 
administratively cheaper and more convenient to take all 
the evidence together - hardly holds water, since such 
evidence will have been a waste of time if the defendant is 
acquitted. Unfortunately, the impression is once again 
given that a defendant before the Tribunal is presumed to 
be guilty until proved to be innocent.
All such procedures push the concept of what is a fair 
trial beyond the limits usually encountered in the British 
courts. It may be that few of these matters will arise in the 
Milosevic trial, but if they do, the Tribunal should not be 
surprised if they cause questions of fairness to be raised.
SO, CAN MILOSEVIC EXPECT A FAIR TRIAL?
So far about 32 defendants out of 80 indicted before the 
Tribunal (with SO who are currently in proceedings before
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it) have been tried on pleas of 'not guilty'. Only five have 
been acquitted, four on appeal. This is much lower than 
the acquittal rate before British criminal courts.
Although Milosevic has made it clear that he refuses to 
recognise the court, he has been cross examing witnesses. 
If his challenges are not to the substance of the witness's 
evidence and he offers no evidence on his own behalf, the 
trial will be one-sided and he is even less likely to succeed. 
The trial can continue without such participation but 
without it there may be no or little foundation for 
submissions to be made on his behalf on any number of 
counts against him. On the other hand, the Tribunal will 
lean over backwards to ensure that he is not procedurally 
prejudiced by not having a lawyer representing him in 
court. It would have been unlikely, for example, to allow 
counsel to go on for four hours with an argument, which 
is not relevant to the client's guilt or innocence. 
Furthermore, Milosevic now enjoys the three-fold 
advantage of being seen as a defendant on his own against 
the power of the international communities' lawyers, 
being able to receive the advice of lawyers outside the 
court if he so wishes and having what are called 'advisers to 
the court', appointed by the Tribunal, to draw to their 
attention any points of law which might conceivably help 
him and which they might either have missed or wouldJ o
seek to hear argument about.
Since international public opinion seems to be strongly 
against Milosevic, he may be fortunate in not having a jury 
to try him. It may even be his good fortune not to be being 
tried in Belgrade. We can assume that judges who are 
expected to exclude all prejudicial sentiments and to try 
the case upon a rational consideration of the evidence and 
the law, and who will moreover have to perform under the 
intense scrutiny of the world's lawyers and informed 
opinion, will be more likely to acquit than a jury.
It is impossible to know, of course, whether in due 
course Milosevic will be acquitted or convicted and of what
alleged offences. It will depend entirely on the strength of 
the evidence against him: and particularly whether there is 
a sufficient evidential link between his actions and the 
undeniable horrors that were directly perpetrated by 
others upon so many people.
This much can be said at this early stage of the 
proceedings: that his appointed judges, two of whom have 
been nurtured on the English system of the common law, 
not only have substantial experience of war crimes cases at 
the Hague but can be expected to have a good appreciation 
of the criticisms that have been levelled against the 
Tribunal, its laws and its procedures. They will want to 
ensure that the justice done in their chamber is seen by the 
entire world to be fair.
Moreover, it is almost certain that an International 
Criminal Court will be set up in The Hague to try 
international crimes other than genocide and crimes 
against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It 
will be modelled upon the Tribunal that will try Milosevic. 
That court will stand no chance of world acceptability if the 
judges, laws and procedures upon which it is to be based 
are seen to be operating unfairly in the highest profile 
international trial that the world has seen for half a century.
Of course we will not know if the trial has been fair until 
it is over. But I am confident that, despite everything, the 
Tribunal is as likely to provide a fair trial as any court in the 
world.
It is certain that Milosevic would not prefer to be tried 
with the al Qaida suspects at Guantanamo Bay - before a 
military tribunal whose proceedings are to be in secret, 
with no right of appeal and the possibility of a death 
sentence to follow. @
Sir Ivan Lawrence QC
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